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Abstract 
Entry barriers make markets less contestable and thereby reduce competition, resulting 
in lower TFP, GDP and employment growth. Following the Lisbon strategy, Member 
States increasingly adopted measures to reduce the costs of starting a business. This 
paper quantifies the macroeconomic impact of such policies and identifies the main 
structural characteristics still driving the differences across Member States. In general, 
countries with high entry barriers and a less developed R&D sector seem to benefit 
proportionally more from a reduction of the so-called red tape barriers. Growth of GDP, 
TFP and employment could be further enhanced by also improving access to finance. 
Countries with a more developed R&D sector experience stronger growth in the long run 
when the reduction of the red tape barriers is accompanied by an improved access to 
finance. 
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1 Introduction 
The entry of new firms to markets and the transformation of new ideas into marketable 
products are at the core of economic growth and higher productivity through the 
reallocation of resources from shrinking and exiting firms to new entrants and growing 
firm.12 A study from the European Commission, covering FR, IT, DE, IE, PT, and ES over 
1997-2003 period, estimated that a 1% increase in the entry rate of firms would increase 
GDP growth by 0.6% and employment growth by 2.67% based on data over the 1997-
2003 period.3  
Reflecting the importance of firm entry for a dynamic business environment, one of the 
main pillars of the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan is to create a more dynamic 
business environment in which entrepreneurs can more easily execute their business 
ideas, flourish and grow. The Action Plan comprises a series of measures that, among 
other objectives, facilitate access to finance, reduce the regulatory burden to start and 
manage an enterprise, and ease bankruptcy procedures. 
Following the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, most Member States began to reduce the 
costs of starting a business (see Ciriaci (2014, table III.2, t)4. Nevertheless, the levels of 
entry barriers are still very heterogeneous across Member States and  some countries 
like IT, CY, MT, and PL have costs to start a business that are, relative to income per 
capita, up to 70 times higher than the best EU performers, i.e. DK, UK, and IE (Ciriaci 
2014, Table III.1).5 The OECD's (2015) indicator on product market regulation also 
shows countries' heterogeneity on barriers to entrepreneurship (see Figure 1).6 Over 
time, most countries have made considerable progress in removing entry barriers, 
although this progress has slowed down since 2008. Hence, in several Member States 
policy makers still have space for significant interventions directed towards creating a 
more dynamic and competitive industry. As a result, policies in favour of SMEs, in 
particular policies that may create the conditions for the flourishing of the so-called High 
Growth Innovative Enterprises (HGIE) are receiving greater attention. Likewise, an 
important policy issue is to understand and measure the impact of policies aimed at 
reducing entry barriers.7 Both large companies and Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) benefit from a reduction in entry barriers. However, large companies are often 
better able to cope with entry barriers than SMEs due to having access to a larger pool of 
resources, including easier access to finance. Consequently, policies aiming at a 
reduction of entry barriers notably aim at supporting SMEs and, in particular, young 
enterprises, as these are the type of firms most often deterred by entry barriers. This is a 
particularly important policy issue in order to increase productivity and growth, as most 
of the job creation by young firms is carried out by new firms entering the market 
                                           
1 For instance, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) using a panel of 18 OECD countries between 1984 and 1998, 
were the first to estimate that lower entry barriers would result in a faster catch-up with the technology 
frontier. This is now widely established in the empirical literature. 
2 Several papers asses the growth contribution of the reallocation of resources from exiting to entering firms. 
For instance, Luttmer (2007) and Gabler and Licandro (2009) estimate that this selection effect can explain 
between 20% to 50% of US GDP growth.  These estimates are consistent with Scarpetta et al. (2002) who 
find that entry and exit contributed to between 20% to 40% of aggregate productivity growth in a panel of 
OECD countries.  
3 See European Commission (2005), "Impact of market entry and exit on EU productivity and growth 
performance", European Economy 222.  
4 The World Bank definition of the costs of starting a business comprises three main elements; the number of 
procedures, the number of days and the cost as percentage of income per capita necessary to start a 
business. These are the so-called red tape entry barriers.  
5 For instance, the costs of starting a business as a percentage of income per capita is 0.2% in Denmark 
compared to 14.2% in Malta. Cross-country differences in entry barriers partially explain cross-country 
differences in the size of entering firms as shown by Bartelsman et al. (2005).   
6 The OECD developed a series of economy-wide indices to measure countries regulatory frameworks and their 
changes over time. The Product Market Regulation index is a synthesis of three indexes on state control, 
barriers to entrepreneurship, and barriers to trade and investment. See Nicoletti et al. (1999) for an 
explanation on how they are constructed.  This ranking of countries differs with respect to the World Bank's 
Doing Business because of the different definition of entry costs used by the two institutions. 
7 At the European level, Sapir (2004) stressed that too much policy attention is paid to incumbent firms to    
ensure fair competition, whereas entrants and young firms tend to be neglected.   
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(Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Similarly, Criscuolo et al. (2014) in a study with 18 OECD 
countries estimate that the share of total employment creation due to SMEs that are less 
than three years old is quite high relative to their size (varying from 60% to around 
28%, as shown in Figure 2 below).  
Firm size is also closely related to business dynamics. The European Commission Product 
Market Review (2013) highlights a non-linear relationship between firm size at both entry 
and exit and an efficient allocation of resources between and within firms.  In particular, 
they find that on average an increase in the size of a firm, when entering the market, of 
1 employee is associated with an increase in efficiency by 1.6%. In addition such a 
relation exhibits an inverted U-shape, peaking with 10 employees at entry.8 This 
indicates that policies that support an increase in the average size of small start-ups give 
rise to efficiency gains.  
Figure 1 below shows the distribution of administrative burdens on start-ups and 
regulatory protection of incumbent firms across OECD countries in 2013. Figure 2 depicts 
the extent to which (young) SMEs contribute to job creation, destruction and 
employment in OECD countries. 
 
Figure 1.  Barriers to entrepreneurship in 2013 - source OECD (2015) 
 
Figure 2. Young SMEs contribute disproportionately to job creation - source Criscuolo et 
al. (2014)  
                                           
8 The empirical analysis uses Eurostat data from 2000-2010 and includes most Member States.  
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Against this backdrop, this paper carries out a horizontal quantification across 17 Member 
States of the potential macroeconomic impact of a reduction in entry barriers in terms of 
fixed costs and financial constraints. This examination will be carried out using the 
European Commission's QUEST III model.9 The goal is to combine qualitative and 
quantitative analysis to critically assess: (i) the role of entry barriers in Member States to 
determine GDP, productivity and employment, and (ii) structural characteristics that 
cause different magnitudes and persistence levels of the impact of an increase in product 
competition within countries. Hence, the paper will support the policymaking process by 
identifying the structural areas in which improvements can be made to foster a more 
dynamic business sector and, ultimately, economic growth.  
 
2 Definitions and literature review 
2.1 What are entry barriers? 
The definition of entry barriers is a topic widely discussed in the literature. Although 
many definitions have been put forward, there is still disagreement on what exactly 
should be understood as entry barriers. Among the widest definitions is that proposed by 
Bain (1956 p. 3). He defines entry barriers as "advantages of established sellers in an 
industry over potential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the extent to 
which established sellers can persistently raise their prices above a competitive level 
without attracting new firms to enter the industry".   
A significant number of elements underlie Bain's definition. He stresses the importance of 
three barriers: (i) economies of scale, (ii) product differentiation, and (iii) absolute cost 
advantage. Economies of scale imply that when firms enter the market they are either 
too small, and hence face a fixed cost disadvantage with respect to incumbents, or they 
enter at an efficient scale leading to a depressing effect on prices. Product differentiation 
allows incumbents to charge higher prices than entrants for instance due to brand loyalty 
or advertising. Finally, an absolute cost advantage allows incumbents to sell profitably 
                                           
9 QUEST III is a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model developed by DG Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN). 
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below the costs of potential entrants. This may be due to a combination of economies of 
scale and brand loyalty or to know how and specific technologies developed by 
incumbents as well as Intellectual Property Rights and trademarks.  
A much narrower definition is proposed by Stigler (1968 p. 67), who defines entry 
barriers as "a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne 
by a firm seeking to enter an industry but it is not borne by firms already in the 
industry". In other words, Stigler recognizes as entry barriers only the cost disadvantage 
due to entry regulations, i.e., the so-called red tape barriers. He also criticises the idea of 
scale economies and capital requirements as entry barriers. In his view, scale economies 
are not entry barriers if entrants and incumbents have equal access to technology. 
Similarly, capital requirements are not entry barriers unless incumbents never faced 
them.    
Several authors have provided alternative definitions of entry barriers which are more or 
less restrictive but within the upper bound defined by Bain (1956) and the lower bound 
defined by Stigler (1968)10. New elements in the definition are included in Shepherd 
(1979) who distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous entry barriers. Exogenous 
barriers are intrinsic to the market and neither incumbents nor entrants are able to affect 
them. Some examples of exogenous barriers are government policies, incumbent cost 
advantages due to technology acquisition, R&D intensity, access to distribution channels, 
customers' switching costs, and entrants need for capital. On the other hand, 
endogenous barriers are a result of incumbents' competition and market strategies aimed 
at impeding firm entry, e.g. advertising, aggressive marketing strategies and predatory 
prices. Exogenous and endogenous barriers may amplify each other, thereby increasing 
their respective impact on markets' competitive structure and dynamics.   
McAfee et al. (2004) suggested an even wider definition than Stigler's by positing that 
"an economic barrier to entry is a cost that must be incurred by a new entrant and that 
incumbents do not or have not had to incur". This means that entry barriers can also 
include costs, such as brand loyalty, that are not labelled as red tapes. Additionally, the 
authors distinguish between primary entry barriers such as IPR or brand loyalty and 
ancillary barriers that are not barriers per se but reinforce other potential barriers to 
entry such as economies of scale.  
The academic debate around entry barriers and their definition has not always addressed 
practical issues in support of actionable policy measures. This void has been filled by 
guidelines developed by the countries' competition enforcement agencies. For instance, 
the European Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers (2004) defines entry 
barriers as "specific features of the market, which give incumbent firms advantages over 
potential competitors". This is a broad definition that includes three main types of 
barriers: (i) technical advantages such as preferential access to natural resources, 
innovation and R&D, IPR, access to technology, economies of scale and scope, 
distribution and sales networks; (ii) legal advantages such as a restricted number of 
licences, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers; (iii) barriers resulting from the established 
market position of the incumbents such as advertising costs, brand loyalty, reputation, 
and customer switching costs.   
2.2 How are entry, exit and entry barriers modelled in 
macroeconomics? A theoretical perspective 
The macroeconomic debate on entry barriers is focused on their impact on firm turnover, 
entry-exit dynamics at the industry level, and how these affect innovation incentives, and 
thereby the main macroeconomic aggregates, such as TFP and GDP growth. Given the 
importance of firm entry and exit as a link to connect entry barriers and economic 
growth, the following discussion revolves around models of firm dynamics. 
                                           
10 For instance, see Ferguson (1974), Fisher (1979), Weizsacker (1980), Gilbert (1989) and Carlton and Perloff 
(1994). 
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The literature modelling entry and exit and their macroeconomic impact is based on the 
Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction (Schumpeter, (1942)). 11 The key idea is 
that growth is driven by new innovations or product varieties that replace old 
technologies or varieties. In this sense, entry and exit play an important role since they 
facilitate innovation by transferring resources from less to more productive firms. This 
reallocation is known as selection effect and generates between productivity growth. This 
is different from the so-called within productivity growth, which refers to the increase in 
firm productivity because of factors intrinsic to individual firms, such as the acquisition of 
new technologies or restructuring as a response to entrants' competitive pressure.  
There are four main types of models dealing with entry and exit: (i) passive learning 
models, (ii) active learning models, (iii) vintage capital models, (iv) life-cycle models. 
Jovanovic (1982) introduces the first model of passive learning in which heterogeneous 
firms enter the industry, after incurring a sunk entry cost, without knowing their true 
cost. Firms are subjected to productivity shocks, learning over time about true 
productivity. Efficient firms stay in the market, inefficient ones exit. Survivors exhibit a 
larger size and higher growth rates than exiting firms and the model converges to an 
equilibrium featuring no entering and exiting of firms. The seminal contribution of 
Hopenhayn (1992) represents a major step forward in the literature on heterogeneous 
firms and entry and exit by allowing for an equilibrium in which entry and exit are 
positive, and by taking into account industry characteristics (e.g., entry barriers, 
demand, and productivity shocks) affecting firm turnover and the industry’s productivity 
distribution.  
In the models of active learning, such as Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Lentz and 
Mortensen (2008) a firm enters the market by paying a sunk cost and actively invests in 
innovation to increase its productivity. The success of its investment depends on whether 
its competitors manage to realize successful investments. When the firm is unsuccessful, 
in terms of productivity and relative to the other firms, this leads eventually to the exit of 
the firm from the market.  
Campbell (1998) proposes an alternative model based on vintage capital in which new 
technology is embodied in more recent vintages. In these types of models, entry is key 
for the adoption of new technologies and thus high entry barriers hinder their adoption. 
Similarly, in the models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1992) 
potential new firms invest in R&D to upgrade or create new varieties and when successful 
they enter the market, thereby replacing existing firms. In these models, innovation 
investments are often equivalent to entry costs.  
Finally, Klepper (1996) models firm entry over the product cycles. In this class of models, 
entry, exit and innovation depend on the maturity of the industry. Young industries 
display high turnover and innovation, which slows down as the maturity of the industry 
increases.  
More recent models with firm heterogeneity include Peretto (1996) and Impullitti and 
Licandro (2016). These papers present endogenous growth models where a reduction in 
entry costs increases the number of firms in the industry, thereby reducing (variable) 
price markups. This pro-competitiveness effect of lower entry barriers raises static 
efficiency, and by increasing the market size of surviving firms, it also promotes the 
incentives for these firms to invest in innovation, leading to higher aggregate productivity 
growth. 
Regarding the effects of entry barriers on unemployment, Felbermayr and Prat (2011) 
show, in the same modelling framework with heterogeneous firms, that product market 
regulations (PMR) can condition average aggregate productivity in the economy by 
sheltering unproductive firms from competition. But these regulations might as well force 
these firms out of the market too. Thus, the sign of the effect depends on the nature of 
                                           
11 Schumpeterian growth theory was firstly formalized in a tractable model in the seminal work of Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). Similar models of Schumpeterian growth have been also developed by Segerstrom et al. 
(1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).  
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the PMR. When regulations increase barriers to entry, the lower competitive pressure 
faced by entrants allows incumbent less productive firms to remain in the market, 
thereby reducing average productivity and increasing the unemployment rate. On the 
other hand, when PMR increase fixed operating costs, less productive firms will be forced 
to leave the market, increasing productivity and reducing unemployment. 
A common characteristic of these models is that entry barriers are modelled as sunk 
costs, i.e. irreversible costs that are paid only once upon entry, thus affecting only the 
entry decision, and that cannot be recovered in the event of exit. That is, potential 
entrants compare the cost of entry with the present discounted value of future profits 
and enter the market only if the latter is greater or equal to the initial cost. In 
endogenous growth models, entry costs are often interpreted as an investment in 
innovation that with some probability will materialize in a new (horizontal innovation) or 
better (vertical innovation) product that may either add to or displace existing ones.12 13 
In equilibrium, the so-called free entry condition holds: firms will be willing to pay sunk 
costs until they are equal to the present discounted value of future profits.   
From a more general theoretical point of view, the relationship between entry rates and 
growth is not straightforward. On the one hand, a decrease in entry barriers (modelled as 
a decrease in sunk entry costs) induces more firms to enter the market, increasing 
competition and thus tends to positively affect the equilibrium growth rate. On the other 
hand, it requires a reallocation of resources (labour) from incumbents to entrants. This 
reduces the resources available to incumbents, negatively affecting their profitability and 
innovation intensity. This channel thus tends to reduce the aggregate equilibrium growth 
rate instead. Moreover, the erosion of incumbents' profitability translates into a lower 
expected profit for entrants impacting negatively on the number of entrants. This trade-
off is present for instance in Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Acemoglu et al. (2015). In 
particular, they find that a subsidy to entry results in only a marginal increase in U.S. 
GDP, whereas the combination of a policy that incentivizes innovation by both 
incumbents and entrants financed by a tax on the operational costs of incumbents can 
have relevant growth effects (in the order of 3.1%). On the contrary, subsidizing only 
incumbent R&D would significantly reduce growth because it deters entry of high-quality 
firms and therefore reduces the selection effect.  
2.3 Overview of the empirical literature on the impact of entry 
barriers  
The recent availability of firm-level data in several countries has stimulated a growing 
body of empirical literature that studies the effect of entry barriers on firm entry and 
growth as well as the impact of policies designed to favour entry and a more competitive 
economy. Using a panel of ten OECD countries Bartelsman et al. (2005) find that about 
20% of firms enter and exit every year in each country and that these firms can be of 
different sizes.  Moreover, the authors observe that successful start-ups grow faster in 
the U.S. than in Europe due to lower entry barriers, which leads in turn to higher 
competition, productivity and growth of firms. Klapper et al. (2006) working on a panel 
of 71 countries confirm a significant negative correlation between entry barriers, 
intended as entry regulations, and firm entry and business density. This correlation is 
especially strong in countries with a stable political climate and good governance.  
                                           
12 This branch of the endogenous growth literature focuses on the competitive and dynamic nature of innovation 
driven by firm's incentives to invest in R&D. This approach takes into account the positive externality that 
current innovations have on future progress and also the negative externality for rivals who lose their 
market share or are forced to exit the market. The latter externality is known as the business stealing 
effect which, when not internalized by the private or public sector, could lead to market inefficiencies 
raising important questions for the policy maker. The business stealing effect is also related to the 
replacement effect discussed firstly by Arrow (1966). He argues that when a monopolistic incumbent 
innovates he partly replaces his own monopoly rents. This gives an advantage to a potential entrant who 
will invest more because it does not have pre-existing rents to replace. 
13 In these models, vertical innovation can often be interpreted either as process or as product-quality 
innovation. Horizontal innovation can be interpreted as new product varieties.  
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Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) are the first to consider the impact of a reduction in entry 
barriers on productivity growth across 18 OECD countries and 23 industries between 
1984 and 1998. Their focus is on the impact of product market deregulations that affect 
entry and on privatization policies. In particular, they estimate that lower entry barriers 
would result in a faster catch-up with the technology frontier in the manufacturing 
industry, but also that the catch-up is slower the shorter the distance to the frontier. 
Hence, entry liberalization increases productivity growth especially in countries that lie 
relatively far from the technology frontier.  
A recent OECD study (Bravo-Biosca et al. (2013)) attempts to explain cross-country 
differences in firm growth dynamics. Using data on ten OECD countries, the authors 
observe that dynamic and growing industries are associated with higher financial 
development, stronger competition in the banking sector and better contract 
enforcement. For our purposes, their findings imply that difficulties in access to capital 
constitute a very important barrier to entry and to growth for start-ups. Policies that 
hinder industry dynamics include strong employment protection legislations and high 
R&D fiscal incentives, which constitute advantages for incumbents.     
Overall, the empirical literature confirms that market deregulation positively affects 
productivity and employment (See Djankov (2008)).14 However, the reach of this 
measure depends crucially on country-specific characteristics such as industry structure, 
legislation and institutional make-up. 
 
3 The macroeconomic impact of Entry Barriers in Member 
States: a quantitative analysis using QUEST III 
QUEST III is a DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model. It was originally 
developed by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) for 
the analysis of fiscal and monetary policies, but the model has ever since been extended 
in various ways. It has been calibrated for 28 Member States as a "three country 
model".15  
We proceed by simulating two scenarios for each Member State. First, we analyse the 
impact of a reduction of the value of fixed entry costs corresponding to 0.1% of GDP per 
capita. In a second simulation exercise, we add to the reduction of fixed costs, a 
reduction of the risk premium for intangibles proportional to the degree of dispersion of 
this parameter in the sample of 28 Member States. The analysis of the differences in 
outcomes for the individual Member States sheds light on how different macroeconomic 
contexts impact on the effectiveness of a reduction in entry barriers and improved access 
to finance.    
However, this approach has a number of drawbacks. First, the current version of QUEST 
III models innovation as being dependent on R&D through the patents generated by 
R&D. Thus, it does not account for investments and innovations which do not result in 
patents. This is a somewhat limited view of both R&D and innovation. Second, for long 
time horizons the simulations are likely to underestimate the impact of R&D, because the 
model cannot very well account for break-through innovations. Third, the conclusions will 
depend on how well the model reflects the transmission mechanisms in the individual 
Member States. Fourth, some Member States have already made considerable progress 
on entry barrier reductions and have well developed financial systems. For these Member 
States further improvements are likely to be small due to low marginal returns of further 
                                           
14 Djankov (2008) reviews 201 papers published in refereed journals studying the link between entry regulation 
and entrepreneurship, productivity and corruption. He concludes that there is an important and statistically 
significant positive relationship between deregulation, on one side, and entry rates and productivity, on the 
other.  
15 i.e. the model distinguishes between the particular Member State being modelled, the rest of the Euro Area 
(EA) and the rest of the world outside the EA (including the rest of the EU).  
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improvements. Fifth, there may be a discrepancy between the estimated entry barriers in 
the model and the actual entry costs faced by individual firms which depend on size, 
geographical location and other country specific characteristics which the model does not 
account for. Still, with these caveats in mind, as we are mainly interested in highlighting 
the macroeconomic factors impacting the effectiveness of entry barrier reductions in 
combination with improved access to finance, the cross-country comparison made below 
is interesting, since, as also pointed out in Bravo-Biosca et al. (2013), it highlights the 
potential for further improvements across countries.   
The sections below discuss how entry barriers are modelled in QUEST III and the 
mechanisms through via which a shock to entry barriers impacts GDP, employment and 
productivity. The typology and magnitude of entry barriers are country-specific and often 
a heritage of countries' past legislations, economic structures and institutions. As a 
consequence, to understand their impact on entrepreneurship and industry dynamism it 
is necessary to frame them in the context of each Member State. In the next 
subsections, we discuss and analyse the main mechanisms behind the propagation of 
entry barriers shocks as well as the results of simulating the macroeconomic impact of a 
policy reform addressed to reduce such barriers. We then provide an explanation of the 
cross-country differences based on the fundamentals of each Member States' economy.  
3.1 Entry barriers and risk premia in QUEST III 
As The treatment of entry barriers in QUEST III is very similar to the approach followed 
in the entry and exit models discussed in the previous section. In particular, QUEST III 
models entry barriers as sunk costs paid by intermediate firms upon entry (see for 
instance, Jovanovic (1982) Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Lentz and 
Mortensen (2008)). This is a good way to represent the administrative burdens that firms 
bear upon entry, but it is only a simplified representation of entry barriers as such, 
because it does not explicitly consider issues such as market structure or the 
technological advantages of incumbents.16  
Access to capital is modelled separately from the cost of entry. Start-ups are often 
constrained by limited access to capital, which impacts negatively on their birth rate 
(European Commission, (2013)). This is particularly severe in some Member States, such 
as Malta, Lithuania and Romania. Hence, an improved access to finance could in principle 
reinforce the impact of a reduction in entry barriers. In the case of QUEST III, financial 
constraints can be partially captured by a risk premium on intangibles. This risk premium 
can be interpreted as a proxy of a country's financial development: when the degree of 
financial development in a country is low (high) an investor has few (many) opportunities 
to diversify their portfolio, and thus, the risk borne by them are higher (lower). This is 
reflected in a high (low) value of the (calibrated) risk premium.  
In QUEST III, both entry costs and the risk premium are modelled as sunk costs that are 
ultimately borne by intermediate good firms in equilibrium. Changes in these two 
parameters show commonalities in their transmission mechanisms. A reduction of entry 
barriers stimulates entry in the intermediate sector and the demand for new patents. 
This leads to an increase of R&D activities and hence a reallocation of high-skilled 
workers from the production sector to the R&D sector, which explains a short-term 
reduction in GDP and a long term increase in real wages. Over time, the enhanced 
productivity effect of heightened innovation outweighs the effect of the outflow of high-
skilled workers, yielding a net increase in TFP and, hence, GDP. Employment reacts 
positively on impact due to a higher demand for high-skilled workers from the R&D 
sector and then, as real wages increase, the size of this effect gets progressively 
reduced. 
The key equation via which these two parameters enter the model is the free entry 
condition of intermediate firms. Free entry means that intermediate firms will enter the 
                                           
16 Out of all the definitions of entry barriers presented in the previous section, this definition is arguably more in 
line with Stigler's (1968) definition, 
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market and thus buy new patents until the value of profits in a given period equals the 
entry costs plus the net value of patents. That is,  
𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑥 =
𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑃𝑡
𝐴
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
+ 𝐹𝐶𝐴(𝑖𝑡
𝐴 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐴), 
where the relevant variables are: the level of entry costs, 𝐹𝐶𝐴, the profit earned by 
design/firm x, 𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑥, the price for licencing a patent, 𝑃𝑡
𝐴,  the GDP deflator, 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 and the 
user cost of intangible capital, 𝑖𝑡
𝐴.17 This equilibrium equation shows that high entry 
barriers must be compensated for by high expected profits or by a lower licencing price 
for the patent, or by a combination of both, for the decision to enter the market to be 
economically feasible. 
Profits of intermediate firms are positively related to the inverse of the mark-up charged 
by final good producers, 𝜂𝑡
𝑦 , and negatively related to the numbers of patents issued, 𝐴𝑡: 
𝑃𝑅𝑡
𝑥 = (
1−𝜃
𝜃
)
𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑡
𝑐𝑥𝑡
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
= (1 − 𝜃)
𝑝𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
= (1 − 𝜃)
𝜂𝑡
𝑦
(1−𝛼)(𝑌𝑡+𝐹𝐶𝑌)
𝐴𝑡 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
, 
where 𝜃 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate good inputs in the final 
good production function, 𝛼 is the fixed-cost-adjusted elasticity of labour in final good 
technology, 𝑌𝑡 is aggregate output from the final good sector, 𝐹𝐶𝑌 are fixed costs in final 
good production, 𝑖𝑡
𝑘 is the user cost of capital, 𝑃𝑡
𝑐 is the price index of final goods, and 
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 is the GDP deflator in year t. As each intermediate firm buys only one patent to 
produce one intermediate product, the number of patents equates the number of 
intermediate firms and represents, together with the mark-up, a measure of market 
competition. It follows from the previous equation that the more concentrated markets 
are, the higher the profits for each intermediate producer.    
The price of patents, determined optimally in the R&D sector, is positively related to the 
unit labour cost of researchers and inversely related to the elasticity of R&D with respect 
to research labour,  𝜆: 
𝑃𝑡
𝐴 =
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝜆
𝑊𝑡
𝐻𝐿𝐴,𝑡
𝛥𝐴𝑡
+ 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡, 
where 𝛥𝐴𝑡 = 𝜈𝑡𝐴𝑡−1
𝜑
𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝜆  is the new knowledge (patents) produced in period t using research 
labour, 𝐿𝐴,𝑡, and the domestic stock of knowledge, 𝐴𝑡, with 𝜈𝑡 representing the efficiency 
level of the R&D production function, 𝑊𝑡
𝐻the wage paid to high-skilled workers and where 
𝑀𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡 stands for the marginal adjustment costs incurred by the firm when employing one 
more researcher.18 Lastly, φ represents the elasticity of the current domestic stock of 
knowledge with respect to the past of domestic stock of knowledge. 
 
An important variable affected by the risk premium is the user cost of intangible capital, 
𝑖𝑡
𝐴.  
𝑖𝑡
𝐴 =
(1 − 𝜏𝐴)(1 + 𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝑔𝑃𝐴)(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1
𝐴 )(1 − 𝛿𝐴)) − 𝑡𝐾𝛿𝐴
(1 − 𝑡𝐾)
+ 𝑟𝑝𝑡
𝐴 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝐴
 
where 𝑟𝑝𝑡
𝐴 and 𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝐴
 represent the risk premium and the shock associated with it, 
respectively. It follows that a positive shock to the risk premium impacts the user cost of 
capital positively and linearly. In the combined entry barrier and risk premium shock 
discussed in section 3.2.2. below, the shock parameter 𝜀𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝐴
 is lowered. 
Substituting the expressions for the profits of intermediate firms, the price of patents and 
the knowledge production function into the free entry condition, we can rewrite the latter 
as follows: 
                                           
17 𝐶𝑡
𝐴 is an auxiliary term related to the change of the price of patents over time. 
18 The efficiency level 𝜈𝑡 depends, among other things, on the foreign stock of R&D of each country's main 
trading partners. 
13 
(1 − 𝜃)
𝜂𝑡
𝑦
(1−𝛼)(𝑌𝑡+𝐹𝐶𝑌)
𝐴𝑡 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
= 𝑖𝑡
𝐴 (
𝑊𝑡
𝐻𝐿𝐴,𝑡
𝜆 𝜈𝑡𝐴𝑡−1
𝜑
𝐿𝐴𝑡
𝜆 +
 𝑀𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
) + 𝐹𝐶𝐴(𝑖𝑡
𝐴 + 𝐶𝑡
𝐴). 
This equation shows the most important structural parameters and variables affecting the 
net impact and transmission of shocks to entry barriers, namely, fixed entry costs, FCA, 
the elasticity of R&D with respect to research labour, λ, the efficiency of the R&D 
production function, 𝜈, and the share of high skilled workers devoted to research, 𝐿𝐴,𝑡.  
The structural parameters of the model are of particular importance as they capture the 
fundamental or deep characteristics of each economy. They are time invariant and can be 
shocked to understand how the variables in the economy would change as a reaction to a 
change in the economic fundamentals. For instance, a proportional shock to entry costs 
will impact Member States unevenly and the differences can be explained in turn by 
differences in the values of structural parameters. Hence, the understanding of such 
parameters is key to explaining the model transmission mechanisms and cross-country 
differences.  
Entry costs are directly calibrated following the methodology developed by Djankov et al. 
(2002), who estimate the costs that new firms need to incur before starting to operate. 19 
In contrast, the calibration of the parameters of the knowledge production function 
results from the restrictions imposed on the equilibrium equations of the model to ensure 
the existence of a balanced growth path. In particular, λ is obtained from available data 
on the wage share of R&D labour in total R&D spending whereas 𝜈𝑡 is directly derived 
from the knowledge production function after estimating the other elasticities, 
normalizing the initial stock of domestic and international knowledge, calibrating the 
growth rate of ideas and initializing the share of research labour.20  
3.1.1 QUEST III simulations 
In QUEST III, high entry barriers preclude some intermediate good producing firms from 
entering the market. This results in a low demand for patents and a low level of 
intangible capital. As a result, the marginal productivity of intangible capital is higher 
than in an equilibrium with more patents, due to decreasing returns to the accumulation 
of ideas. Ceteris paribus, a shock that reduces entry barriers yields higher output effects 
the higher the marginal productivity of intangible capital, i.e. the higher the initial level of 
entry barriers. A similar argument holds for the share of research labour. High entry 
barriers are associated with a small share of labour devoted to research and hence with 
relatively high marginal productivity of labour, again owing to diminishing returns. This 
also means that the effect on output will be larger when entry barriers are reduced. In 
both cases the output effect is amplified by higher R&D efficiency levels, 𝜈, and higher 
elasticities of R&D with respect to researchers. These considerations constitute a starting 
point to understand cross-country differences in the propagation of shocks to entry 
barriers. Differences in the magnitude of impacts are better understood by investigating 
the role played by the different variables and parameters involved. Table 1 reports the 
values of key structural parameters and the initial steady state values of key variables for 
each Member State. 
 
Table 1. Cross-country values of selected parameters and initial steady state values of 
key variables 
 
 
                                           
19 In particular, the authors carry out a very thorough data work to construct a measure of the regulation of 
entry (expressed in GDP per capita terms) across a very large number of countries based on costed 
measures of the total number of procedures and the time it takes to complete them as well as the actual 
administrative costs incurred (e.g., registration fees). For a detailed discussion, please see Djankov et al. 
(2002). 
20 For a more detailed explanation of the parameter calibration and estimation procedure, see D'Auria et al. 
(2009).  
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𝐹𝐶𝐴 𝑟𝑝𝐴 𝜆 𝜈 R&D 
intensity 
(% GDP) 
𝐿𝐴,0 
AT 0.063 0.006 0.398 0.213 0.034 0.012 
BE 0.060 0.005 0.465 0.309 0.027 0.010 
BG 0.054 0.075 0.645 1.282 0.009 0.004 
CY 0.144 0.057 0.551 1.077 0.006 0.002 
CZ 0.100 0.015 0.496 0.484 0.022 0.010 
DE 0.048 0.006 0.496 0.298 0.032 0.012 
DK 0.011 0.003 0.473 0.255 0.036 0.016 
EE 0.022 0.035 0.482 0.416 0.016 0.007 
EL 0.058 0.044 0.652 1.301 0.010 0.004 
ES 0.090 0.044 0.777 1.745 0.014 0.007 
FI 0.049 0.0009 0.441 0.231 0.036 0.015 
FR 0.019 0.007 0.526 0.404 0.026 0.010 
HR 0.064 0.067 0.672 1.598 0.009 0.004 
HU 0.084 0.028 0.595 0.776 0.016 0.006 
IE 0.016 0.035 0.569 0.580 0.017 0.008 
IT 0.153 0.021 0.777 1.752 0.015 0.007 
LU 0.046 0.031 0.594 0.659 0.014 0.008 
LT 0.015 0.045 0.582 0.751 0.011 0.006 
LV 0.030 0.073 0.738 2.027 0.008 0.005 
MT 0.179 0.043 0.773 2.091 0.009 0.006 
NL 0.057 0.017 0.547 0.431 0.022 0.011 
PL 0.196 0.029 0.542 0.738 0.011 0.004 
PT 0.028 0.034 0.773 1.700 0.015 0.007 
RO 0.041 0.069 0.879 7.658 0.004 0.002 
SE 0.025 0.0003 0.335 0.152 0.040 0.014 
SI 0.016 0.008 0.477 0.331 0.028 0.011 
SK 0.045 0.046 0.685 1.439 0.010 0.005 
UK 0.013 0.015 0.495 0.363 0.019 0.010 
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3.1.2 Policy scenario I: lower entry costs 
The first policy scenario, simulated individually for each Member State, is a reduction in 
the value of fixed entry costs for intermediate firms equal to 0.1% of GDP.21 In each 
simulation, the shock is applied to the fixed costs of a given country only; the other 
Member States and the rest of the world are only indirectly affected via trade and 
financial links.22 The following graphs show the impulse response functions (IRF) of GDP, 
employment and TFP for the 28 Member States.  
 
Figure 3. Response of GDP to a reduction in fixed costs equal to 0.1% of GDP 
 
 
 
 
                                           
21 Even though the original entry barrier costs are calculated in GDP per capita terms in Djankov (2008), all 
quantities in the model are expressed in terms of GDP (which is the numeraire). Hence the reason for the 
choice of the size of the shock in GDP terms instead of GDP per capita. 
22 The version of QUEST III model that is used for the simulations is a three-country model characterizing an 
individual Member State versus EU27 and the rest of the world. Thus, it is not possible to study cross-
country interactions or spillovers generated by common deregulation policies.  
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Figure 4. Response of aggregate employment to a reduction in fixed costs equal to 0.1% of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Response of TFP to a reduction in fixed costs equal to 0.1% of GDP  
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The IRFs above display trajectories that are consistent with the previously discussed 
mechanics of the model and show some cross-country differences. In all Member States, 
upon impact, employment and TFP react positively and then progressively converge to 
permanently higher levels, due to the reallocation of resources towards the R&D sector, 
which fosters higher growth in the transition back to the steady state. GDP does not 
necessarily increase upon impact for the reasons mentioned above, but follows the same 
progressive upward-sloped path. 
From Table 1 we can observe that Poland, Malta and Italy exhibit the highest entry 
barriers among all countries, while also characterized by very low R&D intensity and 
initial low quantity of researchers. The high marginal return on intangible capital and 
researchers' productivity result in a lower short term reduction in GDP and in a long term 
trajectory characterised by a higher slope compared to, for example, Slovenia and 
Portugal. As another example, the efficiency level of the Italian R&D production function, 
coupled with a relatively high value of the share of researchers in total labour, 
constitutes an advantage, as comparatively fewer researchers are needed to increase the 
production of knowledge, thereby relaxing the pressure on wages and sustaining a higher 
level of employment also in the long run. Nevertheless, due to comparatively higher 
wages in Italy, the Italian TFP reacts less than the Maltese and the Polish leading to a 
slightly higher GDP response for Poland and Malta in the very long-run. 
Denmark is characterised by the lowest level of fixed costs and the highest share of initial 
research labour and R&D intensity in the sample. Given this leadership position, a shock 
to fixed costs has only a marginal impact on GDP, which exhibits an increase of 0.003% 
after 20 years from the initial shock. Total employment reacts positively upon impact, 
mainly due to an increase in the share of employed low and medium skilled-workers. The 
long-term effect on employment is negligible, increasing around 0.001% with respect to 
the baseline scenario. The initial high share of R&D employment mitigates the negative 
impact on GDP resulting from the reallocation of high-skilled labour from the final good 
sector to the R&D sector. This also implies a comparatively moderate impact on TFP.   
GDP and employment in Slovenia, Finland, Belgium, France and the Netherlands react 
only marginally to a shock on entry costs. Similar trajectories are displayed also by Czech 
Republic, despite its higher entry costs. In this case, the reaction to the shock is 
hampered by a comparatively higher risk premium on investment in intangibles.  
Portugal and Ireland, characterized by both fairly low entry costs and fairly low shares of 
research labour, react strongly upon impact, displaying negative deviations of GDP from 
baseline in the short run. However, their long run GDP trajectory is steeper than the 
Danish one, while TFP and employment react similarly. The effect of the positive long-run 
productivity effect of a reallocation of high-skilled labour towards the research sector, 
which causes the initial drop in GDP, is hindered by a relatively high risk premium. This 
slows down TFP growth, but sustains GDP, at least in the short-run, as the final sector 
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still benefits from a relatively higher number of skilled-workers whose recruitment in the 
R&D sector is partially blocked by high risk premia.  
Slovakia and Lithuania have relatively low entry barriers and very low R&D intensity and 
labour dedicated to research. On the other hand, they have a relatively high elasticity of 
R&D with respect to research labour and also display a relatively strong efficiency of the 
R&D production function. Consequently, the transmission of the shock is amplified and 
exhibits trajectories similar to Malta and Poland, which start with much higher entry 
costs. The same reasoning holds for Spain, whose economy is characterized by fairly high 
entry costs, a fairly low share of researchers and R&D intensity, but an overall efficient 
R&D technology. 
Germany has a robust R&D sector with a high initial R&D intensity and share of research 
labour. This is reflected in the calibration of the production function of R&D (i.e. high λ 
and 𝜈). A reduction in fixed costs, which are higher than the ones prevailing in Denmark, 
results in a positive long term impact on GDP, TFP and employment. This is particularly 
strong after 20 years from the initial shock when the trajectories of TFP and GDP 
becomes the steepest among all countries, owing to the more important role played by 
structural factors (such as the production technology) in the long-term.  
Romania is a particular case, with the lowest R&D intensity and share of research labour 
employed in the R&D sector together with fairly low initial entry costs. A reduction in 
entry barriers boosts entry of intermediate good firms and the demand for new designs. 
The high marginal returns of research labour, combined with a calibration of the R&D 
production function that indicates an efficient use of the inputs used in R&D production, 
draws many skilled workers from the final good sector to the research sector. However, 
GDP reacts positively already in the short run as the strong short-run increase in TFP 
offsets the reallocation effect. As TFP increases, more low and medium-skilled workers 
are hired in the final good sector, and total employment reacts comparatively more than 
in other countries. Over time, upward pressure on wages substantially erodes the initial 
gains in employment. This process renders the variation of employment in Romania in 
the very long-run still higher than in the baseline scenario, albeit it reaches the lowest 
deviation with respect to baseline among all countries analysed. 
 
3.1.3 Policy scenario II: lower entry costs and risk premia 
The second policy scenario simulated in QUEST III combines a reduction in fixed entry 
costs for intermediate firms equivalent to 0.1% of GDP (scenario I), with reduction in the 
risk premium for intangibles that is proportional to the degree of dispersion of its value 
across the sample of countries.23 24 As before, the shocks are applied to each Member 
State individually, while the other Member States and the rest of the world stay the 
same. The following graphs (Figure 6-8) show the impulse response functions of GDP, 
employment and TFP for the 28 countries. 
Figure 6. Response of GDP to a reduction of fixed costs in the intermediate goods sector equal to 
0.1% of GDP and a reduction in the risk premium for intangibles proportional to the degree of the 
sample's dispersion. 
                                           
23 Intangibles are purchased by intermediate firms and hence a reduction of the risk premium can be 
interpreted as easier access to finance for start-ups.  
24 In particular, the reduction applied equals the percentage of the maximum value for the risk premium that 
the difference between the maximum and minimum values in the sample represents. This yields a 
reduction of about 1% of the initial level of the risk premia in each country. 
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Figure 7. Response of aggregate employment to reduction in fixed costs in the intermediate goods 
sector equal to 0.1% of GDP and a reduction in the risk premium for intangibles proportional to the 
degree of the sample's dispersion. 
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Figure 8. Response of TFP to a 0.1% reduction in fixed costs in the intermediate goods sector 
equal to 1% of GDP and a reduction in the risk premium for intangibles proportional to the degree 
of the sample's dispersion. 
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Given the similar nature of the two shocks, in terms of the components of the model 
affected by them, the impact of the combined shock can be interpreted as an 
amplification of the shock to fixed costs only. As discussed before, this leads not only to 
considerable gains in the long term for all Member States but also to asymmetries in the 
distribution of those gains across countries and over time. Table 2 reports the differences 
in GDP gains between the second policy scenario and the first policy scenario, which 
features only a reduction of entry costs. In each year, the three countries that gain the 
least from adding a shock on the risk premium are highlighted in red, while the three 
countries that gain the most are highlighted in bold.  
A number of observations follow from inspection of Table 2. First, as expected, in the 
long run all Member States experience higher economic returns to the joint shock 
compared to the mere reduction of fixed costs. This holds because both a reduction in 
fixed entry costs and risk premia incentivise R&D investment and hence economic growth 
ultimately. Second, in the short run, however, the effect of the joint shock on GDP is 
lower than the effect of only reducing entry costs in certain Member States, including 
Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovakia. This short-run behaviour points to the 
existence of greater incentives in these countries to forego final good production in 
favour of increased R&D employment and hence R&D production, owing to a combination 
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of factors, including relatively low high-skilled employment levels in the R&D sector. 
Third, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Poland are among the countries that exhibit 
the highest comparative gains under the second scenario, on the back of higher risk 
premia and a less developed R&D sector. Fourth, Spain is the only Member State that 
experiences lower impacts on income in the short run, but ranks among the top three of 
highest impacts in the long run in the combined shock scenario. The factors behind this 
dissimilar behaviour in the short vis-a-vis the long-run horizon coincide with the ones 
underlined in section 3.1.1 (namely, fairly high entry costs, a relatively low share of 
researchers and R&D intensity, and an overall efficient R&D technology), with the 
addition of a relatively high starting level of the risk premium (9th highest). Spain thus 
exemplifies the (optimal) process of increasing investment in innovation in the short-to-
medium term, which comes at the expense of foregoing economic growth in those 
periods, but in exchange for higher GDP levels relative to other countries in the long run. 
 
Table 2. Percentage point differences in GDP impacts between policy scenario II and 
policy scenario I at different time horizons 
 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025 2035 2065 2115 
AT 0.001691 -0.00282 -0.00343 -0.00189 0.000827 0.017022 0.041899 0.076586 0.087679 
BE 0.000421 -0.00271 -0.00252 -0.00057 0.002187 0.016441 0.035838 0.057369 0.06174 
BG -0.00191 -0.00021 0.021018 0.050496 0.081445 0.196 0.283988 0.338048 0.346714 
CY 0.004674 0.009106 0.025936 0.048512 0.072352 0.162454 0.237228 0.295076 0.309996 
CZ 0.000352 -0.00897 -0.00726 -0.00036 0.008622 0.050535 0.096411 0.132226 0.138685 
DE -0.00079 -0.0066 -0.00753 -0.00561 -0.00228 0.016657 0.045072 0.090041 0.127986 
DK 0.001507 -0.00095 -0.00082 0.00047 0.002315 0.012224 0.026448 0.043487 0.048051 
EE -0.00171 -0.0078 -0.00207 0.009591 0.023779 0.090545 0.169142 0.234395 0.241569 
EL 0.003791 -0.00311 0.002837 0.017002 0.034697 0.111187 0.181962 0.241315 0.258566 
ES 0.003136 -0.01538 -0.00779 0.01709 0.048743 0.171811 0.254928 0.322792 0.349929 
FI 5.19E-05 -2.8E-05 -4.3E-05 -2.3E-05 1.9E-05 0.000296 0.000732 0.001342 0.001552 
FR 0.003044 -0.00492 -0.00801 -0.00763 -0.00528 0.011499 0.036431 0.071286 0.093077 
HR 0.017427 0.010536 0.031118 0.061738 0.093339 0.204677 0.289316 0.351308 0.368111 
HU 0.00486 -0.0038 0.004345 0.019097 0.035556 0.10201 0.162948 0.202272 0.209588 
IE -0.0054 -0.01558 -0.00982 0.00449 0.022274 0.10244 0.184761 0.242026 0.247993 
IT 0.000607 -0.00935 -0.00655 0.004278 0.018271 0.076763 0.12686 0.172735 0.195712 
LT -0.00512 -0.0117 -0.00459 0.009208 0.025322 0.094742 0.161814 0.205183 0.209663 
LU 0.00031 0.001606 0.011145 0.024703 0.039603 0.102208 0.160169 0.187988 0.18708 
LV -0.00249 -0.00374 0.013447 0.039458 0.067723 0.16921 0.23214 0.270877 0.278135 
MT 0.000689 0.003413 0.026618 0.05651 0.086014 0.179107 0.229133 0.25521 0.258175 
NL 0.001123 -0.00721 -0.0059 0.00052 0.009364 0.053474 0.104809 0.147959 0.155604 
23 
PL 0.008032 0.00252 0.01248 0.02847 0.045729 0.114646 0.181329 0.232934 0.245308 
PT -6.4E-05 -0.01728 -0.01693 -0.00503 0.01188 0.086109 0.146803 0.191566 0.204176 
RO 0.006417 0.003792 0.02228 0.047767 0.072163 0.13363 0.156927 0.181096 0.189328 
SE -2E-05 -0.00047 -0.00205 -0.00396 -0.00567 -0.00898 -0.00827 -0.006 -0.00477 
SI -0.0002 -0.00603 -0.00645 -0.00385 0.000211 0.02179 0.05042 0.080854 0.086653 
SK -0.00283 -0.00477 0.006674 0.024331 0.043736 0.118158 0.172886 0.200421 0.202951 
UK -0.00112 -0.00839 -0.00918 -0.00615 -0.00122 0.026289 0.065711 0.117035 0.143501 
 
 
4  Concluding Remarks 
After the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and subsequent actions such as the 
Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan, several Member States have introduced measures to 
support entrepreneurship, the creation of new firms and the improvement of productivity 
among existing firms, including addressing the barriers that firms face for entering new 
markets. This paper has: (i) framed these policy interventions in a macroeconomic 
context, briefly reviewing the definition of entry barriers, and the macroeconomic models 
and mechanisms through which entry barriers affect GDP, productivity, and employment; 
(ii) quantified the impact of a reduction of entry barriers in the 28 Member States using 
the European Commission's QUEST III model. 
The simulations obtained with QUEST III show that policies aimed at reducing entry 
barriers should be understood and conceived as long-term policies. The positive impact 
on GDP, employment, and productivity becomes sizeable only in the medium to long run. 
Moreover, in the light of the model's results, a mix of policy interventions combining a 
reduction of administrative costs with improved access to finance achieves greater 
benefits for all Member States compared to implementing them individually. Long run 
effects seem stronger in Member States with comparatively less developed R&D and 
innovation systems and financial sectors.  This points to the need for increased efforts to 
facilitate investment in innovation in these countries in order to maximise the impacts of 
such long-term policies.  
An important caveat is that public policy cannot reduce all types of entry barriers, as 
many barriers are a result of inherent product features and competitive behaviour of 
firms as well as countries' past legislations and institutional framework. However, policy 
makers can target regulations including the application of competition laws, thereby 
mitigating entry barriers. In some cases of heavily regulated markets, such as network 
industries, public policy can also play a crucial role in opening up markets, but in other 
cases, the role of public policy in reducing entry barriers may be quite limited. Therefore, 
the overall macroeconomic impact of actionable policies depends on the industrial 
structure of a particular economy. Understanding how sectoral specificities and related 
policies can affect the macroeconomic outcomes of a country is a potential venue for 
further research. 
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